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Op-Ed: We’re withdrawing from the Arms Procurement Commission, and here’s why


Daily Maverick

By A FEINSTEIN, P HOLDEN AND H VAN VUUREN

August 29, 2014

The Arms Deal was a uniquely damaging moment in our young democratic history. It was concluded after decades of uncontrolled spending on foreign and internal wars by the apartheid regime. From the signing of the contracts in 1999 up to R70 billion of public money continues to be spent on weapons of questionable utility. The country was not and is not facing any meaningful military threat. But rather the most pressing problems that faced us then as they do now are inequality, poverty and unemployment

Since its inception the Arms Deal has been dogged by well supported allegations of corruption. We together with many other activists have consistently challenged the State to fully investigate and prosecute these allegations. Four previous investigations have failed to fully probe the Arms Deal.

We have engaged with these matters in different capacities over many years and we have done this out of the commitment to the primacy of the Constitution and the rule of law in our democracy. Given this commitment we believe that all allegations of corruption must be investigated and prosecuted without fear and favour.

After careful consideration, with great disappointment we have decided to withdraw all participation in the Seriti Commission of Inquiry into the R70 billion Arms Deal.

The appointment of the Commission raised great expectations that the truth would finally be established, and that this would challenge the interests of politicians, middlemen and large corporations in one of the most corrupt industries in the world. The Commission had the prospect of serving not only South Africans but all people across the globe campaigning against the devastating impact of corruption in the arms trade.

The Commission has failed on both accounts. It has missed a historic opportunity to support the struggle for transparency and accountability of the powerful.

We have not made our decision lightly. It follows nearly two years of actively trying to support the work of the Commission, assisted by an exceptional pro bono legal team led by Lawyers for Human Rights.

We have taken our decision due to serious and fatal concerns we have regarding the manner in which the Commission has conducted itself. There are four key reasons why we have decided to withdraw:

  1. The Chairman, Judge Willie Seriti, indicated that he was not interested in hearing evidence from witnesses about documents that they had not themselves written. Judge Seriti made this ruling during the testimony of Member of Parliament Mr David Maynier. This prevented Mr Maynier from giving any substantive evidence, as he was not the author of documents that emanated from investigations or government departments. This is particularly disturbing as this limitation was not applied to previous witnesses who were supportive of the Arms Deal. The implication of this ruling is that only those who have been involved in the Arms Deal can introduce evidence. How the Commission intends to discover the truth by only hearing from participants in the Deal is a mystery.

The Chair has also ruled that witnesses should only speak to corruption allegations of which they have personal knowledge. The logical conclusion of this ruling is that only those who have been corrupted, who have corrupted others, or who were intermediaries in such corruption, can give evidence of it. It is obvious that all of these parties have an interest in hiding the truth. Why would the Chair choose to rely solely on their opinions?

We have conducted extensive research into the Arms Deal. We have analysed thousands of documents, and interviewed people who are able to point to where evidence of corruption is likely to be found. We were not direct participants in the Arms Deal. If we are not allowed to talk to documents that we have not written, nor speak to corruption allegations based on documentary evidence, there is no point in our appearing as witnesses. This process will serve to undermine the critics without addressing the evidence they have accumulated. This can only serve to protect the corrupt and compromised.

In response to our attempt to resolve this issue, the Commission has informed us in their correspondence of 27 August 2014 that “The decision [to admit evidence of which a witness not the author, nor facts within a witness’ personal knowledge] will be influenced by the circumstances of each case, including the document’s relevance to the terms of reference and the purpose for which it is sought to be used.” There is no basis on which we can have any expectation that we will be permitted to give evidence on matters not within our personal knowledge, and rely on documents we are not the authors of. The Commission’s rulings to date in respect of other ‘critic’ witnesses, and the Commission’s rulings to date in respect of our cross-examination of other witnesses, clearly indicate the contrary. The Commission has not undertaken that it will now reverse its previous approach. (If it did so, procedural fairness would require the recall of a number of witnesses). Read more here.

Algerians outraged over latest corruption accusations against state oil and gas behemoth


Fox News

March 3, 2013 / Associated Press

ALGIERS, Algeria –  Corrupt and gorging itself at the trough of Algeria’s vast oil wealth — that’s how most Algerians privately view the elites running the country. Yet few have been willing to say so publicly, until now.

New corruption scandals are shining a new spotlight on state oil company Sonatrach, which jointly with BP and Norway’s Statoil runs the desert gas plant that was the scene of a bloody hostage standoff in January.

A recent anguished public plea by a former Sonatrach official shocked Algerians and raised hopes that the leadership will try to clean up the oil and gas sector in Africa’s largest country.

There’s plenty at stake: Algeria is also one of the continent’s richest countries, as the No. 3 supplier of natural gas to Europe, with $190 billion in reserves, up $8 billion in the last year alone.

The Feb. 18 letter by former Sonatrach vice president Hocine Malti in the French-language Algerian daily El Watan broke the silence around the company. Addressing the shadowy leader of Algeria’s intelligence service, it asks if he is really serious about investigating new bribery scandals involving Sonatrach and Italian and Canadian companies.

When Italian prosecutors in January announced an investigation into oil company ENI and subsidiary SAIPEM for allegedly paying €197 million ($256.1 million) in bribes to secure an €11 billion contract with Sonatrach, it provoked a firestorm in the Algerian media, until the North African country’s justice system finally announced its own inquiry Feb. 10.

Malti, author of the “Secret History of Algerian Oil,” scoffed that Algerian authorities were only following the lead of international investigators and wondered if Mohammed “Tewfik” Mediene, the feared head of the Department of Research and Security, would allow the real sources of corruption to be tried in court.

“Is it too much to dream that some of your fellow generals, certain ministers or corrupt businessmen — members of the pyramid that you are on top of — members of this fraternity, might also end up in front of justice?” he asked in the letter. “Or will it be like always, just the small fry are targeted by this new investigation?”

“Will we have to continue to listen for news from the Milan prosecutor to know the sad reality of our country, to discover how certain people, whom you know quite well, people you have come across in your long professional career, have gorged themselves on millions of dollars and euros of the country’s oil revenues?” he added.

The response to the letter was swift. Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi promised that once an investigation was complete “we will take all necessary measures” against those harming the interests of the nation.

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who rarely appears in public, said in a written statement, “these revelations provoke our disgust and condemnation, but I trust the justice system of our country to bring clarity to the web of accusations and discover who is responsible.”

Malti told The Associated Press by telephone from his home in France that he wrote the letter partly out of anger that Algeria had to rely on foreign prosecutors to reveal the extent of its own corruption and addressed it to the head of intelligence to shock people.

“It made a lot of noise because with this letter, I broke a taboo,” he said. “The head of the DRS is an unapproachable figure in Algeria, at times we can’t even pronounce (say) his name.”

It is not the first time the state-owned hydrocarbon company, which provides Algeria with 97 percent of its hard currency earnings, has been enmeshed in scandal.

In 2010, its head, three of its vice presidents and the minister of energy were all fired in a corruption investigation run by Mediene’s intelligence agency.

However, rather than restore faith in the country’s corruption-fighting mechanism, the 2010 purge was widely seen as a chance to settle scores between the DRS and Bouteflika, since most of those fired were his close associates.

Algeria ranks 105 out of 176 in Transparency International‘s 2012 corruption index, and the occasional corruption investigation often just seems to be how the elites settle their scores, such as a string of revelations about prominent politicians in November, which observers said were linked to next year’s presidential elections.

“I realize that people might be shocked by what is happening at Sonatrach — these scandals are terrible and we condemn them as individual acts,” Sonatrach head Abdelhamid Zerguine said on the radio Sunday, the anniversary of Algeria’s 1971 nationalization of its oil industry from the French. He promised to fight further corruption “with utmost vigor,” even while denying it was systemic.

The scale of the scandals is staggering. Nearly €200 million ($260 million) was paid out by the Italians, according to the Milan prosecutor. ENI has pledged full cooperation with prosecutors in their investigations.

Meanwhile, according to a joint investigation by Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper and an Italian business paper published Feb. 22, Canadian company SNC-Lavalin paid a series of bribes of its own to secure a $1 billion engineering contract. Company spokeswoman Lilly Nguyen responded to queries about the case saying “to the best of our knowledge, SNC-Lavalin is not specifically under investigation in the Sonatrach matter.”

With commissions on deals like this going to the highest levels of power, the Algerian press rarely reports about it — until the subject is broached by the foreign media.

Malti, who was there at the founding of Sonatrach in 1963, estimated that the country was losing between $3 and 6 billion annually to corruption in the oil sector alone.

“If a judge says that an inquiry has opened or even a minister promises to take measures against ‘people working against Algeria’s interests,’ I don’t believe them,” Mohammed Saidj, a professor of international relations at Algiers University, told the AP. “It’s just words to appease a public opinion shocked when it hears about the corruption and billions of dollars stolen by high-level political and military officials, including those close to the president.”

The chances of this situation changing are dim, considering how much the country relies on a single company.

In a chapter on Sonatrach in the 2012 book “Oil and Governance,” John Entelis, an Algeria expert at New York’s Fordham University, described the importance of a company established just a year after Algeria won its independence from France, and wrote, “Algeria’s governing elite rely upon Sonatrach for revenue from which they gain power, patronage, and privileges.”

Entelis told AP that the letter in El Watan shows that Algerians are increasingly able to complain about this system, even if that won’t necessarily change things.

“This is the heart of the Algerian political system — Sonatrach, the DRS, civil society in the form of … willingness to make these things public. Some say this is what enables it to maintain itself instead of collapse,” he said.

___

Paul Schemm reported from Rabat, Morocco. Associated Press writer Karim Kebir contributed to this report from Algiers, Algeria.

S. African telecom firm helped Iran evade US sanctions, documents show


By Steve Stecklow  Reuters
August 30, 2012, 8:11 pm

Rogan Ward / Reuters  A shopkeeper awaits customers in a shop advertising MTN airtime sales in Umlazi township in Durban, South Africa.

LONDON — A South African telecom giant plotted to procure embargoed U.S. technology products for an Iranian subsidiary through outside vendors to circumvent American sanctions on the Islamic Republic, according to internal documents seen by Reuters.

The fresh revelations about MTN Group, buttressed by interviews with people familiar with the procurement, come as the South African multinational faces fights on several fronts over its lucrative but controversial Iranian venture, a fast-growing telecom.

MTN is in talks with the U.S. Treasury in an effort to win permission to repatriate millions of dollars of profit now bottled up in Iran by American sanctions on the Iranian financial system. MTN’s chief executive disclosed the talks with U.S. officials this month, saying, “U.S. sanctions should not have unintended consequences for non-U.S. companies.” An elite South African police unit is investigating how MTN obtained the Iranian telecom’s license, following corruption allegations made by a Turkish rival in a U.S. federal lawsuit.

Johannesburg-based MTN Group is Africa’s largest telecom carrier, with operations in more than 20 countries. It owns 49 percent of MTN Irancell, a joint venture with a consortium controlled by the Iranian government. The South African company provided the initial funding for the venture and oversaw the telecom’s launch in 2006.

Hundreds of pages of internal documents reviewed by Reuters show that MTN employees created presentations for meetings and wrote reports that openly discussed circumventing U.S. sanctions to source American tech equipment for MTN Irancell. The documents also address the potential consequences of getting caught. The sanctions are intended to curb Iran’s nuclear program, which Tehran maintains is peaceful.

The equipment included products from Sun Microsystems Inc, Oracle Corp, International Business Machines Corp, EMC Corp, Hewlett Packard Co and Cisco Systems Inc, and was used to provide such services as wiretapping, voice mail and text messaging, the documents show.

In a statement, MTN denied any wrongdoing. The U.S. companies have said they were not aware MTN Irancell had acquired their products, and several are investigating the matter. U.S. Treasury officials declined to comment.

‘It all showed up’ Reuters first reported in June that MTN Irancell had procured U.S. equipment through a network of tech companies in Iran and the Middle East. The article quoted Chris Kilowan, MTN’s top executive in Iran from 2004 to 2007, saying that the South African company was directly involved in obtaining U.S. parts for the Iranian telecom.

The new documents provide a much deeper understanding of the extent of MTN’s procurement of embargoed U.S. goods, exposing new links in the supply chain of products worth millions of dollars. They also give a rare inside look at the thinking of a multinational doing business in Iran and the difficult choices involved. The documents show that MTN was well aware of the U.S. sanctions, wrestled with how to deal with them and ultimately decided to circumvent them by relying on Middle Eastern firms inside and outside Iran.

MTN was not alone. In recent months, new evidence has emerged that other foreign companies, including Britain’s Standard Chartered bank and China’s ZTE Corp, have helped Iran undermine increasingly tougher sanctions. The bank, which agreed to pay $340 million to New York’s bank regulator to settle allegations it hid transactions with Iran, still faces a separate U.S. probe. ZTE is the subject of investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Commerce Department after Reuters reported it had supplied U.S. equipment to Iran’s largest telecom.

The new MTN documents appear to detail an intentional effort to evade sanctions. For example, a January 2006 PowerPoint presentation prepared for the project steering committee — comprised of then top-level MTN executives — includes a slide titled “Measures adopted to comply with/bypass US embargoes.” It discussed how the company had decided to outsource Irancell’s data center after receiving legal advice.

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“In the absence of applicable U.S. consents, it is a less risky route to MTN for Irancell to outsource data centre than it is to purchase restricted products,” the PowerPoint slide says.

The documents also include a lengthy spreadsheet of “3rd Party” equipment dated June 2006 that lists hundreds of U.S. components — including servers, routers, storage devices and software — required for a variety of systems.

A delivery schedule also dated June 2006 lists U.S. equipment needed for “value-added services,” including voice mail and a wiretapping system. The schedule states that the equipment would be “Ready to Ship Dubai” that July and August. It estimates it would take two weeks to arrive in the southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas by “Air or Sea/Road,” and then up to 30 days to clear Iranian customs.

According to a person familiar with the matter, the equipment ultimately arrived by boat. “It all showed up,” this person said.

‘Outstanding issues’ Reuters reported in June that a Kuwait-based telecom-service provider called Shabakkat was used to procure some U.S. equipment for MTN Irancell. Shabakkat’s former country manager in Iran said the products were purchased from a local Iranian company.

But the person familiar with the matter said Shabakkat also sourced U.S. products from a distributor in Dubai called Exit40. The distributor no longer operates.

A Shabakkat executive in Kuwait did not respond to requests for comment. Two former top executives of Exit40 could not be reached for comment.

The documents suggest procuring the U.S. parts often wasn’t easy, and the process was plagued by delays. For example, a “High Level Weekly Report” in November 2006 discusses problems sourcing Sun hardware.

“Urgent decision required to source SUN machines through local supplier,” it states. A note in red at the bottom of another PowerPoint slide says: “According to Shabakkat, all SUN HW is at Dubai waiting for Payment.” HW stands for hardware.

The following month, a spreadsheet detailing “Outstanding issues” cites delays in deploying a system called USSD that enables interactive services. “The USSD platform is completely built on SUN hardware – hence until the SUN hardware is delivered by Shabakkat USSD implementation will be delayed,” the spreadsheet says.

Paul Norman, MTN Group’s chief human resources and corporate affairs officer, said in a statement to Reuters: “MTN denies that it has ever conspired with suppliers to evade applicable U.S. sanctions on Iran or had a policy to do so. MTN works with reputable international suppliers. Our equipment is purchased from turnkey vendors and all our vendors are required to comply with U.S. and E.U. sanctions. We have checked vendor compliance procedures and continue to monitor them and we are confident they are robust.”

The Hawks, a South African police unit, is investigating MTN over allegations contained in a federal lawsuit filed in Washington in March by Turkcell, an Istanbul-based rival. The suit alleges that MTN stole the Iranian telecom license from Turkcell in November 2005 by paying bribes. MTN denies the allegations and has attacked the credibility of former MTN executive Kilowan, who is Turkcell’s key witness in the case. The procurement of banned U.S. products is not a subject of the lawsuit.

‘Civil and criminal consequences’ According to the internal procurement documents, right from the start MTN was well aware of what it termed “embargo issues” and the inherent risks involved.

A December 2005 PowerPoint presentation marked confidential and emblazoned with MTN’s logo noted that the “Consequences of non compliance” included “Civil and criminal consequences.” The PowerPoint slide added that the U.S. government could blacklist MTN, “which could result in all MTN operations being precluded from sourcing products/services from U.S. based companies in future.”

According to a person familiar with the matter, MTN was determined that MTN Irancell procure substantial amounts of U.S. equipment: The U.S. products had performed well in its other networks, and the company’s technicians were familiar with them. But MTN soon learned that its major contractors on the project — particularly Nokia — wouldn’t provide the equipment because of the U.S. embargo.

So MTN executives began to explore ways to procure the parts without violating sanctions, the documents show. The company initially explored an exception to the sanctions known as the “de minimis” rule. Under it, tech products can sometimes be legally exported to Iran from a foreign country if the aggregate value of the U.S. parts or technology inside is less than 10 percent.

According to the person familiar with the matter, MTN believed that if U.S. components comprised less than 10 percent of a large system, its major contractors could legally procure them. But the company learned that the rule applies to each component, not to an overall system.

“Once they figured it out, they realized the vendors wouldn’t accept that,” this person said. “Now they had a problem.”

According to a weekly report from December 2005, MTN also explored another alternative — obtaining U.S. parts from the so-called “grey market,” or unauthorized distribution channels. The report suggests “obtaining go ahead to procure US embargoed products … from grey market notwithstanding the adverse consequences to MTN.”

The person familiar with the situation said MTN was under tremendous pressure to launch the Iranian mobile operator as quickly as possible, because it had told shareholders it projected having 1 million subscribers by the end of 2006. The operator finally launched in October, after months of delays, and is now Iran’s second-largest wireless carrier by subscribers.

The procurement problems are referenced in numerous internal MTN and MTN Irancell documents. A June 2006 status report discussed delays in the delivery of essential components for value-added services, or VAS.

“The primary challenge in the establishment of the VAS solution is simply that the hardware platforms required are of US origin and therefore fall foul of the US embargo on exports to Iran,” the report says. “This means that innovative mechanisms need to be applied to secure delivery of the hardware platforms.” Another progress report makes reference to an “Order placed last week with Turkey and Iran to circumvent embargo issues.”

Reuters reported in June that some of the U.S. equipment — including at least a half-dozen Sun servers –was sourced locally through Iranian companies. But according to the person familiar with the matter, many other U.S. components were acquired via Dubai by Shabakkat, which was paid about $30 million to $40 million to acquire them — about twice their value.

“You had a buyer who was desperate,” the person said, referring to MTN. “They didn’t have any other options.”

Mahmoud Tadjallimehr became a project manager for Nokia on the MTN Irancell project in November 2006. In an interview, he said it was known within the mobile operator that Shabakkat was sourcing U.S. equipment for the project, and he dealt directly with the firm. But he said that one day in discussing a delivery problem, a Shabakkat manager told him, “The issue was not with Shabakkat but with Exit40.” He also said “someone told me that we should never use this name (Exit40) in any kind of emails or conversations.”

According to archive.org, which archives websites, Exit40’s site in 2006 described the firm as a privately held, “leading independent wholesale distributor of IT products” that was headquartered in Switzerland, with offices in Dubai, Florida, Switzerland and India. The site also included this boast: “Exit40’s procurement executives source hard to find or locally constrained products for customers.”

World Bank Bars Two Oxford University Press Subsidiaries From Contracts


Ventures

By Busayo

July 4th, 2012

VENTURES AFRICA – In order to enforce corporate integrity, two wholly-owned subsidiaries of Oxford University Press (OUP), Oxford University Press East Africa Limited (OUPEA) and Oxford University Press Tanzania Limited (OUPT), have been blacklisted from participating in World Bank projects and other agency projects which have an agreement with the World Bank like the African Development Bank.

In their place, Oxford’s archrivals Kenya Literature Bureau (KLB), Longhorn Kenya and state owned Jomo Kenyatta Foundation (JKF) are expected to be the major beneficiaries of the three-year ban.

According to the World Bank, the Kenyan and Tanzanian subsidiaries were blacklisted for irregular payments to government officials for two contracts to supply text books under programmes funded by the Bretton Woods institution.

Oxford East Africa was penalised and delisted by the World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) from the World Bank’s multi-billion shilling project for three years after it was linked in a bribery scandal with top government officials.

The publishing house parent company, Oxford University Press (OUP), was billed Sh292 million ($3.5 million) as part of the settlement.

Oxford’s debarment comes one year after donors pulled out of the $80 million (Sh6.7 billion) Kenya Education Sector Support Programme (KESSP) citing rampant fraud involving senior officials at the Ministry of Education.

The bribery scandal investigation that culminated in a penalties and sanctions started in May last year and closed early this year after establishing that the subsidiaries bribed government officials directly and through agents to win tenders and publishing contracts for textbooks.

Investigators found that Oxford East Africa was involved in widespread bribery that spanned five countries including Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda.

“This debarment is testimony to the bank’s continued commitment to protecting the integrity of its projects,” said Leonard McCarthy, the World Bank Integrity vice-president.

“OUP’s acknowledgment of misconduct and the thoroughness of its investigation is evidence of how companies can address issues of fraud and corruption and change their corporate practices to foster integrity in the development business,” he added.

The World Bank Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) is responsible for preventing, deterring and investigating allegations of fraud, collusion and corruption in World Bank projects, capitalizing on the experience of a multilingual and highly specialized team of investigators and forensic accountants.

The Oxford University Press is to pay the World Bank $500,000 (Sh42 million) for flouting agreed procurement rules and additional £1.9 million (Sh250 million) to the UK’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) for the same offences.
Oxford University Press voluntarily reported the bribery scandal to the World Bank and SFO on suspicion of the underhand dealings at its regional subsidiaries.

“We do not tolerate such behaviour,” said Nigel Portwood, Oxford’s chief executive adding that the company was committed to maintaining the highest ethical standards.

Oxford’s debarment follows a similar one on its rival Macmillan which was banned from bidding for world-bank funded contract till 2014 for bribery linked to an education project in Sudan. Macmillan was asked to pay Sh1.5 billion penalty to SFO after investigations revealed that it had bribed government officials in pursuit of public and World Bank-funded contracts in Africa.

In July last year, Macmillan paid a Sh1.5 billion ($18 million) penalty to SFO after investigations revealed that it had bribed government officials in pursuit of public and World Bank-funded contracts in Africa.

The publishing house was found to irregularly won tenders for the supply of text books to public schools in Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia between 2002 and 2009.

The publisher remains banned from bidding for World Bank–funded contracts up to mid-2014. After the scandal, Macmillan sold its Kenyan and Ugandan subsidiaries to veteran publisher David Muita for Sh300 million ($3.6 million).

Since 1970, foreign publishers like Thomas Nelson, Heinemann, and Longman have exited the Kenyan publishing market thereby creating more room for local publishers.

Africa on K Street: Lobbying Is Not Restricted to the Developed World


Huffington Post.

By Vijava Ramachandran

This is a joint post with Julie Walz.

February 13, 2012

The aid community is well-accustomed to pushing for transparency in foreign aid transactions. But are we missing another key flow of money?

A recent article by Geoffrey York, African bureau chief for the Globe and Mail, described a contract signed a few years ago by the Government of Rwanda with Racepoint Group, which was tasked with doing an image makeover for the Rwandan government for a monthly fee of over $50,000. The rationale was that public perceptions of Rwanda were dominated by the horrific genocide that occurred in the 1990s, along with accounts of human rights abuses and media censorship. The contract with Racepoint reportedly aimed to increase the number of stories of Rwanda’s successes and block criticism of the government and its alleged human rights abuses. The effort landed more than 100 positive articles per month in newspapers from the New York Times to BBC, increased discussions of travel to Rwanda by 183%, and decreased discussion of the genocide by 11%, according to Racepoint.

In 2007, Racepoint also led a campaign to promote Libya‘s Gaddafi as an “intellectual and philosopher,” in advance of the thirtieth anniversary of his rule. Four years later, Libyan rebels hired the Washington lobby firm, Patton Boggs to help them unseat Gaddafi.

Other African governments have also invested in lobbyists. The Kenyan government contracted one of the top Washington lobbying firm Chlopak Leonard Schechter to restore its reputation after stories of election-related violence dominated the news headlines. It hoped to further U.S. support for its military and intelligence work, fighting piracy and dealing with the deteriorating situation in Somalia. Chlopak Leonard successfully placed positive stories in US media outlets and was able to call attention in Congress to the Somali crisis. President Obama’s Somalia policy even includes specific recommendations from the Kenyan government’s proposal to fight piracy and terrorism…Read more.

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